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"legal conclusions" and "allegations of wrong doing" did apprise
the parties and court of the particular transactions complained of.
By requiring specific allegations of facts in the petition, the court
actually required a more detailed and stricter pleading than is
required in an action. 308 Though the procedures of the special
proceeding are more summary and expeditious than those of an
action,30 9 one may argue that a petition giving the respondent "notice
of the transactions . . . intended to be proved . . ." 310 affords him

ample basis on which to oppose it. In that light, there is practical
reason, too, for using 3013's criteria for pleadings in actions as the
criteria to govern petitions in special proceedings. A counterpoise
here is that the special proceeding is less appropriate to the use of
disclosure devices (though they are available there 311) than is an
action, for which reason it may be incumbent upon a petition to
be more informative than a comolaint. These factors were not
investigated by the court. The CPLR itself was apparently satisfied
to make 3013's criteria applicable, by cross-reference, not only to
the petition in an Article 78 proceeding, 312 but to the petition in all
special proceedings governed by the CPLR .3 1 This point does not
appear to have been urged in the Gallagher case. That case, moreover, appears to have been disposed of on the merits rather than
on the mere omissions of pleading, though these omissions are
referred to by the court.
ARTICLE 80-

FEES

Poundage fees.
314

Morris v. Morris

involved an application by a sheriff for

poundage fees. The sheriff served a copy of an execution on a
garnishee. After the garnishee's refusal to deliver the property
(a promissory note) to the sheriff, the judgment creditor instituted
a special proceeding against the garnishee under CPLR 5225 and
5227 (as contemplated by 5232(a)) to compel surrender of the
note. The court granted the poundage fees, holding that the
sheriff was entitled to poundage notwithstanding the fact that it
was necessary for the judgment creditor to bring a proceeding when
the garnishee failed to turn the note over to the sheriff pursuant
to the levy. The judgment creditor prevailed in the proceeding,
and payment of the note was made directly to plaintiff's attorneys
308 See the Foley case, supra, note 305.
309 CPLR Art. 4; see 1 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL
PRACrICE 401.01 (1963).
310 CPLR 3013.
311 See CPLR 408.

CPLR 7804(d).
See CPLR 402.
14 43 Misc. 2d 854, 252 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
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instead of to the sheriff. The court held this to be the equivalent
of a "settlement," 315 entitlingthe sheriff to payment. That the
sheriff did not have physical custody of the property levied upon
was not deemed significant; it was reasoned that the sheriff had
done all that was within his power to conserve the property for
the creditor.
ARTICLE 81 -

COSTs GENERALLY

Costs disallowed under present law in case properly commenced in
supreme court under prior law.
In Casella v. Board of Educ.,318 the lower court awarded
plaintiff a sum for costs in addition to a five thousand dollar personal injury judgment. The appellate division reversed, holding
to
that under Section 1474 of the CPA, plaintiff was not entitled
costs. When this action was commenced, section 1474(1)317 provided that a plaintiff could recover no costs in an action brought in
the supreme court of any county in New York City if the action,
except for the amount claimed, could have been brought in the
City Court of the City of New York, unless the plaintiff recovered
four thousand dollars or more. The 1962 amendment to section
1474 substituted the Civil Court of the City of New York for the
City Court and six thousand dollars as the minimum sum. Judgment was entered after the effective date of the amendment. Even
though the civil court was not in existence at the time the action
was commenced, the court found that plaintiff was bound by the
amendment, -reasoning that the right to costs depends on the statutes
in effect at the time the action is terminated, not when it was begun.
The difficulty here is that the civil court was not in existence
at the time the action was commenced, and the action was properly
brought in the supreme court under the provisions then in force.
The case would be the typical one contemplated by CPLR
10003. That provision permits recourse to prior law, and application
thereof, whenever - in a case commenced under prior law - the
application of the new law "would work injustice." Though CPLR
8102(1) is not really new law- being the same for present purposes as CPA § 1474(1) as amended in 1962 - there would appear
to be within CPLR 10003 a general power to avoid the unfortunate
result of the Casella case. The Civil Court Act contains a provision
of similar import, seeking to avoid the application of the new act
to actions commenced under its predecessors whenever it appears
necessary to apply prior law.
315 "Where a settlement is made after a levy by virtue of an execution,

the sheriff is entitled to poundage upon the value of the property levied upon,
not exceeding the sum at which the settlement is made." CPLR 8012(b) (2).
316 21 App. Div. 2d 690, 250 N.Y.S.2d 474 (2d Dep't 1964).
327 CPA § 1474(1) is now CPLR 8102(1).

